Attributeless Waheguru

Introduction

Since the publication in 2006 of our first article Nirgun-Sargun Conundrum, which sought to expose Sikhism’s contradictory theology-proper of God, we have successfully responded to all attempts at defending this incoherent concept. [1]

However, as is the case with all false theologies, there is more to this conundrum than meets the eye; and so the aim of this paper is to further unveil the inconsistencies inherent in this orthodoxy.

This will be done by critiquing the Nirgun saroop (form) of God sans attributes. Before this is undertaken, however, it is necessary, given the conspicuously apparent interpretational differences that exist among Sikh scholars vis-á-vis the theology of God, that we firstly delineate this disparity.

Once this is achieved, it will be contrasted against the coherent Islamic doctrine of Tawheed (Unity of Allah’s existence) and its theological principles in order to demonstrate which theology-proper of God truly upholds both His absolute perfection and the theistic apodictic belief that He is, as St Anselm of Canterbury famously put it, “the greatest conceivable being” in every possible respect in comparison to which nothing greater, in any way, can possibly exist.

Sikh Pantheism?

Sikh theology holds that God was, at one stage, sans attributes; that is to say, He was “attributeless” or “unattributed” prior to the becoming of the temporal world. This notion has been delineated by a number of prominent Sikh scholars in different ways. For example, Gurbachan Singh Talib puts it thus:

While Dr Surjit Singh Gandhi affirms:

It is understood from Prof G.S. Talib that in the Nirgun state, God is void of all attributes:

Similarly, Rajinder Kaur Rohi states:

In spite of attempted efforts made by Sikh scholars in forwarding reconciliatory explanations for these two divergent states, there exists a distinct lack of congruity over each states interrelatedness vis-á-vis its understanding.

Some Sikh scholars hold that in the Sargun saroop, Waheguru is, in his essential divine nature, physically part of His creation in the literal sense, while others have adopted a diametrically opposite position.

Of the latter is Prof Daljeet Singh who, on the basis that “the becoming world is His creation, and not his emanation; nor is it identical with Him”, [7] has concluded that the “description of His immanence and its operation [is] metaphoric[al]” [8] and “a symbolic way of expressing God’s connection with the world”. [9] He elaborates that since “the universe is in time and space … is changing and is governed by fixed laws”, God, who is “[f]ree” of these limitations and conditions, “[can]not [be] determined by any laws known to us”. [10]

This figurative rendering of the creator-creation dichotomy is, however, rejected by a number of prominent Sikh scholars.

Prof Wazir Singh, head of the Dept. of Guru Gobind Singh Religious Studies at Punjabi University in Patiala, holds an entirely opposite theological belief. He is of the opinion that “God is identical with the universe” (bold ours) and reasons that since “the world as a totality … [is a] developing universe which is not a finally perfect order of things … [then] the nature of God must also be developing; if the world is finite so must be the Divine“. [11] (bold, underline ours)

He elaborates:

Prof Wazir is, in actuality, pushed towards acknowledging and embracing this tenuous affirmation of God and His creation being identical because of his literalist interpretation of Waheguru’s Nirgun state being “transcendental”, “necessary and infinite” and its mutual opposite, Sargun, being “contingent and finite”. He explicates:

The pure, shapeless essence turns into cosmic existence, with all its contours and contents, evolutionary processes and infinite creative advances. [14]

The problem with figuratively interpreting Sargun to the exclusion of Nirgun is that no objective reason is given for such a seemingly arbitrary choice. Hence, given this glaring problem, as well as the vastly more difficult logical problems that arise from the theological position opted for by Prof Wazir et al (to be further explored in detail below), Daljeet’s assumptive approach is an entirely convenient ad hoc escape route.

And since all of creation is a manifestation of Waheguru’s Sargun state, it is completely understandable why Dr Rohi also champions this more coherent assumption that Waheguru is, in the literal sense, intrinsically part of and identical to his creation.

While Daljeet asserts that “God is not the material cause of the world”, [15] Dr Rohi holds that “He prevails not only as being the basic substance or the material cause of the world but also as being the Person (purkha) Who creates as being the efficient cause as well” [16] (bold ours). Rohi continues:

Similarly, Rajinder Kaur (not to be confused with R.K. Rohi), daughter of the famous Akali leader Master Tara Singh, holds:

Dr Gurdip Singh Bhandari illustrates how, before the becoming of the world, “every aspect of creation lies dormant in” Waheguru who, prior to the “Divine urge” whereupon the “the Formless assumes form … and thus this world of a myriad colours takes shape”, is in a “state of complete tranquillity and oneness”. [20] He then states:

Rohi also cites a number of scriptural proofs for her position. After repeating that “every finite and infinite thing and being was created from within God as His own manifestation” she cites Guru Gobind Singh as declaring:

And Guru Arjan Dev is quoted as saying:

Rajinder also makes mention of a number of similes and metaphors used by the Gurus in making clear God’s immanence:

Prof Manmohan Sehgal of Punjabi University, Patiala, holds that Waheguru “lives within living beings in the form of soul. After one’s death, the part meets the whole and soul is dissolved in Him, who is the Absolute Soul. Even the physical elements of the Universe dissolve in Him after they perish” (bold ours). He further adds:

Likewise, Prof Surjit Singh Gandhi affirms that Waheguru “is omnipresent not only by knowledge and power but also by nature His eternal spirit pervades all beings” (bold ours) citing the following scriptural proof:

He continues:

In essence, these explanations are more pantheistic than monotheistic, as Rajinder concedes in her response to Macauliff who, she believes, was “misled … [towards] the conclusion that the Sikh view of God is purely Pantheistic”. [31] (bold ours) And she recognises that the only distinction between a purely pantheistic doctrine and a partial one is that the former “reduces God to a substance or a principle” whilst the latter upholds God as “a Person ‘Purakh (Purusa)’, ‘Karta-Purakh’, ‘Adi-Purakh’, ‘Param Purakh’, ‘Akal-Purakh‘”. [32]

Daljeet, on the other hand, has set out in a number of his works to counter the position shared by the above list of illustrious academics who argue for a more pantheistic conception of Sargun. Although Daljeet accepts that there are “a number of places [in SGGS where] the Guru describes God as informing the river, the fish, the boat, and everything”, he condemns any pantheistic conclusions drawn from this as “superficial” because, as stated earlier, “all these verses are only a symbolic or another way of expressing the immanence of God”. [33]

However, rather than responding with an apologetic that is clear, methodical and lucid, Daljeet succeeds instead in presenting a confused [34] and jumbled explanation that raises more questions than answers.

For example, although most Sikh scholars agree, regardless of their differing interpretive stance over the Nirgun-Sargun duality, that Waheguru is Ik (One), Daljeet asserts that “when we say that God is both Transcendent and Immanent, it does not at all mean that there are two parts, stages, or phases of God. It is the Transcendent God who is everywhere, in each heart, place and particle. It is He who is both Transcendent and Immanent”. [35]

The point of confusion here is with Daljeet’s insistence that the Nirgun-Sargun states are not “two parts, stages, or phases of God”. As already alluded to above, according to Prof Bhandari, before Waheguru assumed form in his Sargun state, “[t]he Gurus … used ‘Sunya’ in conjunction with terms like samadhi, tari (trance, meditation) or sahaj (equipoise, balance) or sach (holy truth) … [to] describe the state of complete tranquillity and oneness of the Absolute Self, and refer to that latent form in which every aspect of creation lies dormant in Him, waiting for the operation of the Divine urge for its unfoldment”. [36] However, could Waheguru have been in Sunya, etc. after the becoming of creation? The answer is an obvious no.

What is more, in our article Bijla Singh is ‘Contradicting Allah’, we argued that Waheguru must have experienced both an intrinsic and a relational change with the becoming of creation:

These changes are also acknowledged by certain Sikh scholars. For example, Rohi states:

God is also transcendent because the immanence of God is not identical with the whole being of God. [38] (bold ours)

Prof Wazir shares this understanding:

Similarly, Prof Trilochan Singh upholds that:

Given these persuasive arguments, it is difficult to see how Daljeet et al. [41] could seek to refute this position.

Moreover, assuming that this is not a genuine lapse in concentration or a typographical error on his part, what is perplexing is how Daljeet could have concluded that “the Transcendent God … is everywhere, in each heart, place and particle” when he himself recognises that not only is Waheguru, as the Transcendent, “beyond space and beyond time”, but that he only “becomes Immanent in it [creation]” after he “creates the universe … [while] being at the same time Transcendent”. [42]

Daljeet continues his apologetic ambiguity by claiming that “the Gurus say that before He created form, He was Formless; before He was Immanent, He was Transcendent only: and yet, all immanence, expression, creativity were inherent in Him, and so was His Word, in essence”. [43] We then have something called Naam. Daljeet reveals:

We are further told that this manifestation of ‘Naam extends to all creation. There is no place or space where Naam is not.’ [1. p. 4]. And with “numerous verses in Guru Granth Sahib where Naam and God have been described synonymously”, including “[b]oth Naam and God … mentioned as … ‘Permeating and informing all things, beings, space and interspace’ …. This unambiguously leads us to conclude that God and Naam are one and the same, and the latter may be called the immanent or qualitative aspect of God, since God has been described both as unmanifest (nirguna) and the Creator, and Ocean of values”. [45]

The same conclusion is reached by Dr Lalit Mohan Joshi, i.e. “nam is not mere name, but the Ultimate Reality itself … [the] Omnipresent Existence which manifests itself in the form of creation and is the source and sustenance of all beings and things (GG, 284) … Nam is the source of creation and like God is all-pervasive. At the same time, nam is coextensive with creation; there is no space where nam [sic] is not-jeta kita teta nau vinu navai nahi ko thau: all that Thou hast created is Thy Name, i.e. manifestation; there is no place where Thy Name does not pervade (GG, 4)”. [46]

In what has followed, the ambiguity arises from the way in which Naam has been expounded. Can this explanation serve to clearly and incontestably show a definitive distinction between Waheguru’s intrinsic nature and his creation? If Naam and Waheguru are “one and the same”, where Naam is said to be “permeating and informing all things, beings, space and interspace” and is “coextensive with creation” to the extent that “[t]here is no place or space where Naam is not”, then it is difficult to see how Waheguru and his creation are not identical. This definition of Naam’s near all-encompassing and all-pervasive presence in the world again lends more support towards a pantheistic view of Waheguru than the opposite.

The ambiguity does not end there. In spite of the obvious disparity that exists between the two saroops vis-á-vis Waheguru’s attributes, Sikh scholars, such as Parma Nand, remain intransigent in their insistence that “[al]though He manifests Himself in all forms, sentient and non-sentient being the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment, at the same time, yet, he remains One, changeless, constant and imperishable”. [47] (bold ours) This assertion, however, unsurprisingly smacks against the following observations:

All in all, the Sikhs seem to be in a rather sticky catch-22 situation; they certainly are in no state to have their cake and devour it too.

Having evaluated this core ontological difference of opinion over whether Waheguru is, in his essence, physically part of His creation in the literal sense, we can now move on to examine a central doctrinal point which, to our knowledge, no reputed Sikh academic disputes: Waheguru was, in his Nirgun state and prior to the becoming of the temporal world, void of all divine attributes.

The Attributeless God

It is not the case that He acquired the name Creator (Al-Khaliq) only after creating (something), or the name Originator (Al-Bari) only after originating (something).
– Imam at-Tahawi (d. 321H/ 933AH)

In Islam, it is heresy (Arabic: kufr – disbelief) to believe that Allah, the Most High, was, is or could be void of any or all of His divine attributes sans creation or otherwise. In contrast, Sikhism, as we have shown, holds a belief that is diametrically opposed.

In complete contrast to the convoluted and unintelligible nature of Sikh philosophical theology, the Islamic understanding of the essence of God is pellucid and comprehensible. This is because, unlike the philosophers and false prophets who, in their misplaced attempt to decipher the divine, were entirely confined to the use of their limited intellects, God’s bona fide prophetic emissaries were exclusively privy to the truth of knowledge concerning His essence. Originating from the source of all truth who endowed humankind with reason and rationality, it is inconceivable to think that God would convey revelatory knowledge that would be incompatible with man’s intellect.

Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) famously said of Islam’s true religious intellectual elite:

It is for this reason that the Muslim scholars, who inherited not only this pristine and authentic prophetic knowledge, but more importantly its correct understanding and interpretation, were able to derive sound and irrefutable principles vis-á-vis the divine names and attributes (al-asmaa was-sifaat) of Allah.

In regards to this topic, the following cited principles will be used to dissect the notion of an attributeless God:

To begin, Daljeet claims that it is meaningless to speak of a God with divine attributes, or one who exercises His Will, sans creation:

His reasoning proceeds as follows:

Daljeet’s assumption, in brief, is that a “God of Attributes” cannot be logically tenable without a created object towards which His attributes can be exercised.

The premise on which this argument hinges, however, is the assumption that the divine attributes of God are analogous or comparable to the human; an assumption that violates principle C above, more specifically: tamtheel.

A leading scholar of the modern era, Shaykh Muhammad ibn Saalih al-‘Uthaymeen (d. 1421H/ 2000CE), briefly forwarded a definition for Tamtheel as “the act of mentioning an attribute together with its like”; [61] in Daljeet’s case: likening the attributes of God to His creation.

Given the relative nature of humanity, it goes without saying that such attributes can only be exercised in a changing and relative world. But, to say the same of God would necessarily require a concession to anthropomorphism on His part since there cannot be any logically plausible reason to support this assertion without affirming that God’s absolute perfect attributes are, either completely (tamtheel) or partially (tashbeeh), [62] comparable to those of the relative and imperfect human. Hence, what holds true for them must also hold true of God.

This fallacious assumption has been repeated throughout history by philosophers from different socio-religious backgrounds, including Muslims, ad nauseam. The irony after all this is that Daljeet himself actually clearly negates tamtheel (anthropomorphism):

Daljeet’s contradictory reasoning is further exposed as follows: If God’s “expression of Naam was prior to the creation of the universe where ‘God manifested Himself into Naam and at the second place the world was created'”, [64] or, as he puts it elsewhere, “God created Himself and Naam, and at the second place was created the universe”, [65] and yet it is both “impossible to think of a God of Attributes in the absence of a changing world” and for “God’s Will … [to] be exercised only in a changing world and towards a goal”, then how could Waheguru have exercised his will to do anything in the absence of the world?

To put it more lucidly, since the presence of a relative and changing world is a prerequisite to Waheguru exercising his will to create, where the act of creating is one of God’s divine attributes, how could he will to create Naam (or Himself), or anything else for that matter, before the becoming of such a world? Daljeet et al.’s position seems to be self-defeating.

Coming onto principles A and B, these have most comprehensively been explained by Ibn Abil-‘Izz (d. 792H), the well known commentator of the universally accepted book of creed ‘Aqeedah at-Tahawiyyah, authored by the great sage and scholar Imam at-Tahaawi (d. 321H/ 933CE).

The following points 13, 14 and 15 of Imam at-Tahaawi’s creed are directly concerned in tackling the general idea of an attributeless deity. The fact that the Imam was addressing these heresies at that time shows that such an idea preceded Guru Nanak and Sikhism by half a millennium:

Ibn Abil-‘Izz’s commentary of point 13 correlates with principle A wherein he reasons that “Allah is qualified from eternity with attributes of perfection, both attributes of essence and action”. [67] Shaykh ‘Uthaymeen makes clear the apparent distinction between the attributes of Allah’s essence and His actions:

Ibn Abil-‘Izz continues to declare:

Denying the active or voluntary attributes of God is precisely what Daljeet does by claiming that “when God was by Himself, the question of ‘love and devotion, of good or bad actions, or of the saved or Saviour’ could not arise, there being nothing other than Him”. [70]

We have already highlighted that though this limitation is necessarily true of mankind, there exists no logically plausible reason to extend this to include God. We have also mentioned, albeit in passing, that Sikhism is not unique in this belief. According to Ibn Abil-‘Izz, in proclaiming that “He [Allah] is qualified with His attributes eternally from before the creation of the world”, Imam at-Tahaawi “refutes the … claim that Allah did not at first have the power to act or to speak, and then He came to have such powers. Action and speech became possible after it was first impossible. The impossible changed into the possible”. [71]

This is a convincing response when juxtaposed with the recognition that an absence of any, let alone all, of God’s attributes for a given duration implies imperfection. When Sikhs allege that Waheguru was attributeless in the pre-Sargun stage, they are, in fact, affirming that Waheguru became absolutely perfect after being imperfect at the moment of the becoming of the world. But why does Ibn Abil-‘Izz conclude that such a concept, á la Nirgun-cum-Sargun, implies the impossible changing into the possible? Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen offers the following answer:

While recognising why an absolute perfect deity must possess absolute perfect attributes, one may still be prompted to ask why “everything that truly exists must have an attribute”? Ibn Abil-‘Izz compellingly posits:

This a priori axiom that a living entity void of all attributes can only really “exist” as an abstract, nonconcrete, hypothetical and imaginary idea should be enough to pull the very rug from under Daljeet et alia.

While refuting the heretical beliefs of the infamous Avicenna, Shaykhul Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah reaches the same conclusion in arguing that an “essence that is existing without knowledge and to which knowledge is added … is a corrupt representation”, [74] and that “an essence which has no attribute has no existence but in the mind”. [75]

Ibn Abil-‘Izz’s incisive evaluation uncovers further failings in the Sikhi doctrine:

A question arises from what Ibn Abil-‘Izz has adduced above: If we accept, for arguments sake, that Waheguru was attributeless sans creation: was he alive/ did he exist during His Nirgun saroop? It would be a travesty of intelligence for anyone to even hint at an answer in the negative. No one with a sound and sincere disposition could claim that an eternally existing deity cannot be described or could not possess the attribute of life/ existence for any given duration. It would clearly be nonsensical, semantically speaking, to accept that God was, even for an instant, non-existent, given that it contradicts the definition of the term eternality and, thus, completely negates the idea of an eternally existing/ living God.

And the same would be true, for example, in negating the attribute of knowledge.

What does it mean when someone claims a living entity is completely void of its necessary attributes or that “it is impossible to think of a God of Attributes”? It essentially entails the dismissal of any conceivable thought about the ineffable nature of the Nirgun state of Waheguru, even after the becoming of creation. In order to remain consistent in defence of this argument, it must be maintained that even speculating, for instance, over the relative spatial position of the Nirgun saroop in relation to the creation is futile. But, again this approach is self-defeating given that Sikhs readily affirm that the Nirgun state of God is wholly transcendent.

The problem becomes ever more acute when Sikhs fail to recognise the apparent disparity that exists where on one hand the mantra of Nirgun being “beyond the scope of human comprehension” and “ineffable” is continuously parroted, and yet on the other reams of scholarly work elucidating on the difference between the two states are readily produced and published. For example, we are reminded by Daljeet that “[t]he Gurus have cautioned us against the inadequacy of human logic to comprehend Him … The nature of God transcends all known categories of thought. The Creator of these limited categories cannot be judged by them”. [77] Similarly, Surjit Singh Gandhi echoes:

And yet Daljeet seemingly belies these cautions by conflictingly stating that Waheguru “is both in the universe and outside it”.[80] The reason for this is quite simple and one that Daljeet is fully cognisant of:

This paradoxical position is also mentioned by Prof Wazir Singh, who more accurately observes:

And it goes without saying that this linguistic compulsion of assigning names would also entail the impossibility of rejecting the apparent meaning any name carries and its associative attribute. Hence, any rational minded person would be compelled, at least, to acknowledge that God’s attribute of life is an eternal sine qua non of His essential being, while also recognising that this would not be possible if the attribute were negated (ta’teel), or its apparent meaning misinterpreted/ distorted (ta’weel), or conditioned on futilely attempting to comprehend its reality/ modality (takyeef), or attempting to analogously liken Him in any way, shape or form to His creation.

As we have shown, Daljeet was forced into answering the paradoxical question of “what came first: the chicken or the egg?” by arguing that without the presence of a relative and changing world, Waheguru could not exercise his will or his attribute to create, raising the question of how he could have ever willed to create anything in the first place without the presence of a relative and changing world? This self-defeating argument proves the validity of principle D:

Since the attribute of life is, as we argued above, an eternal sine qua non of God’s essential being, it is intransitive. Unlike the divine names, such as, The Most-Merciful (Ar-Rahman), The Most-Loving (Al-Wudood), The All-Just (Al-‘Adl), etc., which are transitive and require an object for God to be merciful, loving or just towards, the same cannot be said of his names: The Ever-Living (Al-Hayy), The Unique (Al-Ahad), The Self-Sufficient (As-Samad), etc. It would be ludicrous to say that Allah is necessarily self-sufficient or unique towards something external to himself!

If Sikhs, however, acknowledge the rationale behind principle D, they would be compelled, by extension, to reject this counter-intuitive notion that God was attributeless or ineffable sans creation.

These inconsistencies arising from such mentally oppressive and paradoxical ideas are not, however, something new to Sikhism. To the contrary, there existed, and still do, heretical Muslims who held equally perplexing views.

Historically, the first person associated to the Muslim community to introduce the heresy of negating Allah’s attributes in toto was a man by the name of Jahm bin Safwan (d.128H/ 745CE) who, according to Shaykhul Ibn Taymiyyah, took this doctrine “from the students of the Jews and idolaters”, [84]. Ibn Taymiyyah elaborates:

And like Daljeet et al., “Jahm did not affirm … [a] “Will” (al-Iraadah)” [86] for Allah. Jahm’s reason for denying God’s names is, of course, based on his fallacious interpretation of principle C cited earlier. Tashbeeh did not simplistically mean anthropomorphism by the mere sharing of a name, but rather likening the reality or modality that the name stood for. For example, the names loving, knowledgeable, wise, etc. are accepted as attributes essential to both God and humankind; yet, it would be erroneous to claim that the reality or modality of God’s attributes are comparable to those of His servants.

What is more, Ibn ‘Uthaymeen identifies that since “al-Hayyu [the Living who does not die] is a name that comprises all the perfect Attributes of life” [87] (where the life of Allaah is incomparable to that of His creation since Allah’s life is absolutely perfect and infinite whereas the creations’ is not [88] ); then, consequently, “the existence of the Creator is necessary, while the existence of the person is possible”. [89] It would, thus, be nonsensical to negate this, or any other, name merely on the basis of it being shared by two entities!

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen also mentions a group who believed that God was “neither in ‘uluw (loftiness [transcendent]) nor in sufl (opposite ‘uluw: lowness); He is neither inside the world nor outside it; neither to the right nor to the left; neither joined nor separate”. He declares “this position [to be] absolute ta’teel (negation) because it is a description of al-‘adam (non-existence)”, while adding that some scholars said:

In essence, apart from a semantic one, there is no conceptual difference between systematically articulating this dual affirmatory-negatory approach of God’s attributes, and negating them in toto by describing Him as attributeless, they are both apt descriptions of non-existence.

Another possible answer to the above question could be that while the name, e.g. Ever-Living (al-Hayy), is affirmed, its associated attribute, life, is rejected and denied. Incidentally, this is not a hypothetical situation, for Shaykh ibn ‘Uthaymeen noted:

Since it must be intuitively acknowledged that an eternally pre-existent living being is necessarily attributed with all its eternally pre-existent attributes, it follows that:

There can be no difference between Allah’s attributes in terms of their existential reality: they are all eternally present and an essential part of His eternal essence.

Another major pitfall with this idea that attributes were brought into existence with the creation of Naam and the becoming of the world, is identified by Ibn Taymiyyah:

In this case, the opposite also holds true: whatever is brought into existence after once being absent is a created entity, and since God is the Creator and not created, He can never be absent in His essence, which must be inclusive of all His attributes, for any length of duration. This point is succinctly put by Ibn ‘Uthaymeen as follows:

There are also the philosophical quandaries that ensue from the idea that Waheguru was in a state of Sunya. Daljeet details this doctrine as follows:

The following metaphysical question comes to mind when faced with the notion that Waheguru arbitrarily decided at some moment to become immanent and create having, before then, remained in his Nirgun state from eternity past: Is it more befitting the absolute perfection of God to believe that he remained creatively quiescent for a duration before deciding to create, or that he has been creating continuously from eternity past without being quiescent?

We have already covered the doctrinal irrationality of an attributeless God arguing that God’s essence has always been inclusive of the divine name and attribute of creating even before the becoming of the temporal world; but, what is more befitting his absolute perfection vis-á-vis the aforementioned question?

The Islamic position on this is given in principle B cited above:

In relation to there being no limit or end to His actions, then this cannot belong to the category of an infinite regression of causes because, as Ibn Abil-‘Izz argues, “this is impossible, for we cannot imagine that one cause derives its causative power from another cause, and that from a third cause and so on ad infinitum”. [99] Rather, Allah’s endless actions belong to the category he defines as ‘necessary’ where:

Hence, a God who is quiescent to the point of not willing to act for a given duration through eternity past is less perfect in comparison to one who constantly wills to act. According to Ibn Abil-‘Izz:

And so “first, Allah acts as He wills and pleases [and] He has always done so … [because] He cannot be thought of as losing [this ability] at any time”. [101]

However, Ibn Abil-‘Izz’s brilliant reasoning continues as he cautions against understanding God’s necessity to create to mean that these created “objects co-exist with Him”. To the contrary:

What should be borne in mind at this juncture is that the scholars who traverse the path and follow the example of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) do not in any way accept the notion that individual entities exist pre-eternally as a concomitant of God’s existence. And this is precisely the reason why Ibn Abil-‘Izz clearly delineates that “everything else is created and comes into existence after a time when it was non-existent” (bold, underline ours); meaning that we affirm the genus of infinite events, with each and every created object preceded by non-existence, and not a single pre-eternally existent object.

This understanding is, thus, in complete harmony with what Allah and Prophet Muhammad (upon whom be peace and blessings of Allah) respectively meant when they proclaimed:

With this in mind, Ibn Abil-‘Izz concluded that “since the existence of an endless series of events in the future is not inconsistent with Allah being the Last, without anything coming after Him, the existence of an endless series of events in the past is not inconsistent with Allah being the First, without anything going before Him. Allah is always there doing and speaking whatever and whenever He wills from eternity …”. [105]

Conclusion

The interpretational differences that exist among Sikh scholars vis-á-vis the theology of God, proves beyond doubt a distinct lack of hermeneutical homogeneity and conformity vis-á-vis the definition and understanding of the Nirgun-cum-Sargun transformational process.

Contrary to Daljeet Singh’s valiant efforts, what became clear was that not only were there Sikh scholars who believed that Waheguru was, in his Sargun saroop, physically part of His creation in the literal sense, i.e. in his essence, but that this interpretation was much closer to a pantheistic conception of Waheguru than the oft-espoused monotheistic one.

In regards to the doctrine of an attributeless deity, where God is said to be void of all his divine attributes sans the becoming of the temporal world, then the arguments in support of this were not only self-defeating, but also, when deconstructed and compared to the apodictically sound principles of Islamic theology, shown to be logically incoherent and wholly untenable.

For instance, the argument that the subsistence of a relative and changing world is a necessary prerequisite to Waheguru exercising his will to create turned out to be fallacious as it transpired that the actual cause (willing to create) bizarrely preceded its own condition (a relative and changing world)! This brought forth the paradoxical question of: “What came first: the chicken or the egg?”

Further, since God’s attribute of life is an eternal sine qua non of His essential being, belief in the doctrine of an attributeless God sans creation lead to the patently absurd idea of an eternally existing God not being described or not possessing the attribute of life/ existence for a given duration.

It was also shown that a doctrine which holds that God, viz. Waheguru, remained creatively quiescent through eternity past, i.e. choosing not to exercise his creative will before arbitrarily deciding at some moment to create, was less befitting the absolute perfection of God than one which affirmed that he, viz. Allah, has been creating continuously, and thus, constantly exercising his divine will from eternity past without being quiescent.

All in all, it is reasonable to conclude in light of all the above that the Sikh theology-proper of God vis-á-vis the concept of an attributeless God is logically inconsistent and mentally oppressive in comparison to the coherent Islamic doctrine of Tawheed (Unity of Allah’s existence) and its theological principles.

Subhanakallaahuma wa bi hamdika, ash-Shahaadu al-Laa ilaaha illa Ant, astaghfiruka wa atoobu ilayka.

Acknowledgements

Thanks (jazakumullaahu khairan) to both Abu Iyaad Amjad Rafeeq (Aqidah.com) and Abu ‘Abdur Rahman (Islam-Sikhism Researcher/ Editor) for their critical feedback and sagacious comments and suggestions.

[1] See: I.S. Dhillon (1, 2, 3), Project Naad, Saajan Sandhu and Bijla Singh.
[2] J.S. Mann, S.S. Sodhi, Concepts in Sikhism – Cognitive Psychology – Mind Map Approach to Understanding Sikhism for the Second Generation Sikh Children, (Global Sikh Studies.net, online Word file, 9 Dec. 2009), p. 202.
[3] S.S. Gandhi (2007), History of Sikh Gurus Retold: 1469-1606 C.E. Vol. 1, (Atlantic Publishers & Distributors), p. 129.
[4] J.S. Mann, S.S. Sodhi, op. cit., p. 467.
[5] R.K. Rohi (1999), Semitic and Sikh Monotheism – A Comparative Study, (Punjabi University, Patiala, India), p. 99.
[6] Ibid., p. 100.
[7] D. Singh, K. Singh (1997), Sikhism – Its Philosophy and History, (Institute of Sikh Studies, New Delhi), p. 20.
[8] Ibid., p. 42.
[9] Ibid., p. 21.
[10] Ibid., p. 20.
[11] P. Singh (1985), Sikh Concept of the Divine, (Guru Nanak Dev University Press, Amritsar), p. 146.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., pp. 146-7.
[14] S.S. Bhatia, A. Spencer (1999), The Sikh Tradition: A Continuing Reality (Essays in History and Religion), (Publication Bureau Punjabi University, Patiala, India), p. 91.
[15] D. Singh (2004), Sikhism: A Comparative Study of its Theology and Mysticism, (Amritsar, Singh Brothers), p. 196.
[16] R.K. Rohi (1999), op. cit., p. 96.
[17] Ibid., pp. 145-6.
[18] R. Kaur (2003), God in Sikhism, (Secretary Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar), p. 52.
[19] Ibid., pp. 39-40.
[20] J.S. Mann, S.S. Sodhi, op. cit., p. 459.
[21] Ibid., pp. 459-60.
[22] Fn.15: see Dasam Granth. Charitropakhyan, Verse 389.
[23] R.K. Rohi, op. cit., p. 102.
[24] Fn.16: Guru Granth Sahib, p.131, Trans. G. S. Talib.
[25] R.K. Rohi, op. cit., pp. 102-3.
[26] Fn.17: “Whatever is there isyour creation and all manifest your Glory.” – Guru Nanak Sahib, Shabad Hazare.
[27] Fn.18: Bhai Gurdas – Varan.
[28] R. Kaur, op. cit., p. 54.
[29] P. Singh, op. cit., p. 75.
[30] S.S. Gandhi (2007), History of Sikh Gurus Retold: 1469-1606 C.E. Vol. 1, (Atlantic Publishers & Distributors), pp. 131-2.
[31] R. Kaur, op. cit., p. 54.
[32] Ibid., p. 55.
[33] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 42.
[34] His confusion is soundly typified by his erroneous interpretation of the Qur’anic verse: “Is He not closer (to you) than the vein of the neck.” (50:16) as a referral to God’s Immanence in Islam. (Ibid., p. 42.).
However, a correct understanding of Allah’s relationship with his creation has been accurately delineated by Dr Rohi:

She also states:

Allah’s continuous relationship with the world is, for example, through His absolute, perfect Knowledge and Mercy encompassing all things. Hence, when Allah says in the Qur’an that He is closer to us than our own jugular vein, the earliest and best of generations – the Pious Predecessors (Salaf us-Saalih) – understood this to mean Him being closer to us through His Divine Knowledge.

[35] D. Singh, op. cit., p. 189.
[36] J.S. Mann, S.S. Sodhi, op. cit., p. 459.
[37] R. Kaur, op. cit., pp. 41-2.
[38] Ibid., p. 67.
[39] S.S. Bhatia, A. Spencer, op. cit., p. 91.
[40] P. Singh, op. cit., p. 123.
[41] Such as Prof G.S. Talib, who preposterously reasons that since “God is both Transcendent and Immanent, [it] does not mean that these are two phases of God one following the other. God is One, and He is both nirguna and sarguna“. (J.S. Mann, S.S. Sodhi, op. cit., p. 111)
[42] D. Singh, op. cit., pp. 188-9.
[43] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 39.
[44] D. Singh, op. cit., p. 197.
[45] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 38.
[46] J.S. Mann, S.S. Sodhi, op. cit., p. 316.
[47] P. Singh, op. cit., pp. 32-3.
[48] Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751CE) said:

[49] Abu Dawood, Sunan, 3641; At-Tirmithi, Sunan, 2683; Al-Albaani, Saheeh Sunan Abi Dawood, 2/407.
[50] Fn.11: Majmoo’ul-Fataawaa, 5/206; Mukhtasarus-Sawaa’iq al-Mursalah, 1/232 and Badaa’i’ul-Fawaa’id, 1/168.
[51] A. ibn ‘A.-Q. as-Saqqaaf, (Trans.) D. Burbank (1999), General Principles Regarding Allaah’s Attributes, (Salafi Publications, Article ID: AQD030010), p. 1.
[52] Fn.12: Soorah Ibraaheem (14):27.
[53] Fn.13: Al-Qawaa’idul Muthlaa, p. 30.
[54] A. ibn ‘A.-Q. as-Saqqaaf, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
[55] Ibn Taymiyyah; commentary: M. K. Harras (1996), Sharh Al-Aqeedat-il-Wasitiyah, (Dar-us-Salam Publications), p. 33.
[56] Examples of Allah’s transitive divine names:

[57] Abu I. A. Rafiq (1998), General Principles Regarding Allaah’s Names, (Salafi Publications, Article ID: AQD030007), p. 3.
[58] D. Singh, op. cit., p. 190.
[59] Ibid., p. 191.
[60] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 22.
[61] M. bin S. Al-‘Uthaimin (2009), Commentary on Shaikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah’s Al-‘Aqidah al-Wasitiyyah Vol.1, (Darussalam, Riyadh, KSA), p. 145.
[62] Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen differentiated between the two as follows:

[63] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 41.
[64] D. Singh, op. cit., p. 197.
[65] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 39.
[66] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari (2000), Commentary on the Creed of at-Tahawi, (Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud Islamic University, Imadat Al-Bahth Al-‘Ilmi, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America), pp. 49, 57, 61 .
[67] Ibid., pp. 49-50.
[68] M. ibn S al-‘Uthaymeen (2003), Exemplary Foundations Concerning the Beautiful Names and Attributes of Allaah, (T.R.O.I.D. Publications; Toronto, Ont., Canada), p. 56.
[69] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
[70] D. Singh, op. cit., p. 190.
[71] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit., p. 53.
[72] M. ibn S al-‘Uthaymeen, op. cit., p. 40.
[73] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit., pp. 50-1.
[74] Y.J. Michot (2003), A Mamluk Theologian’s Commentary on Avicenna’s Risala Adhawiyya – Part 2, (Journal of Islamic Studies 14:3, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, May 2003), p. 310.
[75] Ibid., p. 329.
[76] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit., pp. 50-1.
[77] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 21.
[78] S.S. Gandhi, op. cit., p. 130.
[79] Ibid., pp. 132-3.
[80] D. Singh, K. Singh, op. cit., p. 21.
[81] Ibid., p. 39.
[82] S.S. Bhatia, A. Spencer, op. cit., p. 202.
[83] Abu L. A. Rafiq, op. cit., p. 3.
[84] Ibid., 5/20.
[85] Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu’ Fataawa, 12/311 see also 8/460.
[86] Ibid., 8/230.
[87] M. bin S. Al-‘Uthaimin, op. cit., p. 245.
[88] Ibid., p.169.
[89] Ibid, p.170.
[90] M. bin S. Al-‘Uthaymeen, (Trans.) S. as-Saleh (1998), Explanation of Aayat al-Kursi, (King Fahd National Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data, Riyadh), pp. 75-6.
[91] M. bin S. Al-‘Uthaimin, op. cit., p. 157.
[92] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit.,, p. 51.
[93] The Decisive Criterion between the Awliyaa (friends) of the Most Merciful and the Awliyaa of Shaytaan, p. 196.
[94] M. bin S. Al-‘Uthaymeen, (Trans.) S. as-Saleh, op. cit., pp. 88-9.
[95] D. Singh, K Singh, op. cit., p. 39.
[96] Fn.12: Soorah Ibraaheem (14):27.
[97] Fn.13: Al-Qawaa’idul Muthlaa, p. 30.
[98] A. ibn ‘A.-Q. as-Saqqaaf, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
[99] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit., p. 55.
[100] Ibid., pp. 55-6.
[101] Ibid., p. 57.
[102] Ibid., pp. 55-6.
[103] Fn.22: Part of a hadith recorded by Muslim, Adh-Dhikr, 2713. Also see Abu Dawud, Al-Adab, 5051; At-Tirmidhi, Ad-Da’wat, 3397; Ibn Majah, Ad-Du’a 3873; Ahmad, 2:381, 404.
[104] Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, (Trans.) M. ‘A.-H. Ansari, op. cit., p. 35.
[105] Ibid., p. 55.